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Interacting with Computers 20 (2008) 311–325‘‘She is just stupid”—Analyzing user–agent interactions
in emotional game situations
Matthias Rehm *
Multimedia Concepts and Applications, University of Augsburg, Eichleitnerstr. 30, D-86159 Augsburg, Germany
Available online 13 February 2008Abstract
A multiplayer dice game was realized which is played by two users and one embodied conversational agent. During the game, the
players have to lie to each other to win the game and the longer the game commences the more probable it is that someone is lying,
which creates highly emotional situations. We ran a number of evaluation studies with the system. The specific setting allows us to com-
pare user–user interactions directly with user–agent interactions in the same game. So far, the users’ gaze behavior and the users’ verbal
behavior towards one another and towards the agent have been analyzed. Gaze and verbal behavior towards the agent partly resembles
patterns found in the literature for human–human interactions, partly the behavior deviates from these observations and could be inter-
preted as rude or impolite like continuous staring, insulting, or talking about the agent. For most of these seemingly abusive behaviors, a
more thorough analysis reveals that they are either acceptable or present some interesting insights for improving the interaction design
between users and embodied conversational agents.
 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Embodied conversational agents; Social interaction; Multiuser interaction1. Introduction
Apart from their conversational skills, the non-verbal
behavior and the appearance of embodied conversational
agents become more and more realistic. Thus, embodied
conversational agents offer great promise to more natural
interaction in social settings like tutoring or gaming. Prom-
inent examples of such agent systems include the Steve
Agent (Rickel and Johnson, 1999), the real estate agent
REA (Cassell et al., 2000), the GRETA Medical Advisor
(Pelachaud et al., 2002), the agent MAX (Kopp et al.,
2003), the virtual patient (Hubal and Day, 2006) or the tac-
tical language training agent (Core et al., 2006).
Despite these successful examples, virtual agents are still
research prototypes and seldom tested with real users in
real settings. Thus, not much is known about the accep-
tance or behavior towards such artifacts that goes beyond
small-scale user studies in laboratory settings.0953-5438/$ - see front matter  2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.intcom.2008.02.005
* Tel.: +49 821 598 2343; fax: +49 821 598 2349.
E-mail address: rehm@informatik.uni-augsburg.deReeves and Nass (1996) claim that every type of media
and especially new media like virtual agents is treated as
a social communication partner in one on one interactions.
They call this the CASA paradigm—Computers Are Social
Actors—and have shown in a number of experiments
derived from typical human–human interaction studies
that people indeed seem to treat computers and other
media like they treat real people. For instance, to attribute
technical expertise to a system it matters if a male or female
synthesized voice is used. Although the CASA paradigm
seems to hold true for certain aspects of interactions with
virtual characters, results of actual user studies are not con-
clusive and sometimes even contradict each other. Krämer
(2005) gives an excellent overview of a number of different
studies. To give an example, it was shown that the use of an
embodied conversational agent can have both positive and
negative effects on solving a given task.
All of these studies and all of the above mentioned sys-
tems focus on dyadic interactions between one user and
one agent. If we turn to communications with more than
two interactions partners, we find systems where one user
Table 1
Order of casts and probability that the announcement for a given cast is
true
Cast Prob. Cast Prob. Cast Prob.
31 1 53 0.61 11 0.22
32 0.94 54 0.56 22 0.19
41 0.89 61 0.5 33 0.17
42 0.83 62 0.44 44 0.14
43 0.78 63 0.39 55 0.11
51 0.72 64 0.33 66 0.08
52 0.67 65 0.28 21 0.06
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approaches to such multiparty conversations have been
inspired by research on interactive drama that aims at inte-
grating a user in a scenario—either as an audience member
or an active participant. An example includes Avatar
Arena (Rist et al., 2003), where the agents perform a pre-
sentation for the user interacting among each other. An
interesting feature of Avatar Arena is the simulation of lis-
tener as well as speaker behaviors based on empirical stud-
ies of human–human conversations. Traum and Rickel
(2002) have addressed the issue of automatically generated
multiparty dialogues in immersive virtual environments.
The characters are based on the Steve architecture which
has been enhanced by a multi-modal dialogue model to
handle turn taking in such a challenging scenario. The Vic-
Tec system (e.g., Paiva et al., 2004) realizes a multi-agent
learning environment to teach kids strategies against bully-
ing relying on a Forum Theatre metaphor. The user is able
to interact with one of the agents and suggest plans of
action that will influence the storyline. In the NICE fairy
tale game (Gustafson et al., 2004), a user can enter the fairy
tale world of H.C. Andersen where she may meet three dif-
ferent types of agents like the helper agent that accompa-
nies her through the world, suggesting lines of action.
Hardly any work so far has been conducted on the real-
ization of scenarios with multiple users and a synthetic
agent. An exception includes the work by Isbister et al.
(2000) who concentrate on social interactions between sev-
eral humans in a video chat environment which is sup-
ported by a so-called Helper Agent. In contrast to
Isbister et al., we focus on a game scenario in which the
agent does not appear in the role of a moderator, but takes
on a similar role as the human users. The questions arise, if
users regard an artificial agent as an equal conversational
partner worthy of being attended to even if there are other
human interlocutors around and what kind of behavior the
users will show towards the agent.
In this article, we are still not moving outside the labo-
ratory setting but our scenario differs in an important
aspect from the standard user evaluation. Instead of one
user and one agent who engage in a task-oriented dyadic
interaction, our game scenario features two users and an
agent who play a game of dice together. This offers com-
pletely new ways of evaluating the interaction with virtual
agents. On the one hand this setting allows us to directly
compare the social behavior of the users towards each
other with their social behavior towards the virtual charac-
ters at the same time in the same situation. On the other
hand, users are free to talk with one another which gives
us additional insights into what they think about the agent
and how they interpret its behavior.
In the next section, the game environment is shortly
introduced (Section 2). Section 3 gives an overview of the
verbal and nonverbal behavior that is examined in the eval-
uation studies. Section 4 then deals with the evaluation of
gaze behavior which is followed by an evaluation of the
users’ verbal behavior (Section 5). After a general discus-sion (Section 6) the article closes with a conclusion (Section
7).
2. Gamble: a multiuser environment for emotional
interactions
2.1. The game
Gamble is a game of dice that is played by at least three
players. The players have to cast the dice and then they
have to announce a result with the constraint that the result
must be higher than the one announced by the previous
player. The next player can either believe the announce-
ment and cast the dice himself or he does not believe it,
the actual result is revealed and depending on the truth
of the announcement the winner of the round is declared.
Let us look at a short example. Because the interpretation
of the cast is a bit complicated, Table 1 gives an overview
of possible casts. The cast is interpreted in the following
way: the higher digit always represents the first part of
the cast. Thus, a 5 and a 2 correspond to a 52. Two equal
digits (11, . . ., 66) have a higher value than the other casts,
the highest cast is a 21. Now let’s assume that player 1 is on
turn. He casts the dice and then inspects the dice without
permitting the other players to have a look. Player 1 has
to announce his cast with the constraint that he has to
say a higher number than the previous player. For instance,
if the dice show a 52, but the previous player already
announced a 61, player 1 has to say at least 62. Now player
2 has to decide whether to believe the other player’s claim.
In this case, he has to cast next. Otherwise, the dice are
shown and if player 1 lied about his result he has lost this
round and has to start a new one.
For the Gamble system, one player in this multiplayer
game was substituted by a virtual human. The inherent
complexity of such multiuser scenarios can be controlled
due to the round-based character of the game. At every
time of the game, exactly one player has the floor. And
he can either announce a result or rate the announcement
of another player. Thus, the game can be modeled by a
finite state transducer with just three states (see Fig. 1).
This transducer completely describes the game flow and
is utilized by the central control component of the Gamble
system, the game server.
1 Ball makes use of a three-dimensional model that goes back as far as
Wundt (1896) who specified a third dimension that could be called
dominance to distinguish e.g. between emotions like fear and anger that
have both a negative valence and a high level of arousal.
STARTING
BELIEVING CASTING
A: Announcement
R: Result
W: Winner
L: Loser
CP: Current Player
NP: Next Player
[A][R] : [L][A][R]
NULL : [CP]
YES : [NP]
[A][R] : [CP][NP][A]
NO : [W][L][A][R]
Fig. 1. Overview of game states in Gamble along with in- and output
symbols.
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Emotional models have increasingly become the center
of interest in agent research over the last decade. Partly,
this is attributable to the fact that one’s own emotions play
a crucial role in decision making (see e.g. Damasio, 1995),
partly to the fact that emotional information can easily be
expressed by facial expressions, and partly to the fact that
it becomes feasible to register the user’s emotional state
and thus integrate it in the agent’s decision making process
(see Picard, 1997). Here we will focus primarily on the first
reason, i.e. emotional models for influencing the behavior
of a virtual character.
One approach that has proven successful in this regard
and is widely used for implementing an agent’s emotional
behavior is the OCC-model. This model was developed
by Ortony et al. (1988) for describing the cognitive apprai-
sal processes that result in emotional reactions to perceiv-
able stimuli. The model was originally designed to
capture the reactions to other people’s actions and emo-
tions. To this end, a hierarchical taxonomy of 22 emotions
is defined that places the different emotions in 4 non-over-
lapping groups like Attraction Reactions or Event Reac-
tions. To give an example of an emotion from the group
event reactions let’s say you have to catch a train at eight
o’clock, you managed to get the bus at half past seven
but the bus to the station is stuck in the morning traffic
jam. This event is not compatible with your goal of catch-
ing the train and consequently results in the emotion of dis-
tress. Well-being emotions are triggered by events and are
constituted of the two emotions joy (event is compatible
with goals) and distress (event is not compatible with
goals).
In the large number of implementations that exist, the
model is also employed to calculate the agent’s emotionally
influenced behavior. The wide use of this model is attribut-
able to a great degree to the fact that it is computationally
straightforward. Examples of OCC-implementations
include the EmotionEngine (Gebhard et al., 2004), Émile
(Gratch, 2000), or the Affective Agent Architecture of
FearNot! (Aylett et al., 2006). In the FearNot! agent archi-tecture, the OCC-model serves the two functions of apprai-
sal and coping. The appraisal process calculates the
emotional state that results from a given stimuli for the
agent. The coping process then models the emotional influ-
ence on the action selection. It is best described by an iter-
ative execution of the appraisal process, this time not on
external stimuli but on internally generated plans.
A different approach that is widely employed makes use
of a dimensional model of emotions (Lang, 1995). Such a
model is often used for emotion recognition as well as emo-
tion generation (Ball, 2002; Kim et al., 2005; Prendinger
et al., 2004). Typically, emotions are defined by the two
dimensions of arousal and valence. Emotional states are
then represented on two dimensions, one denoting the
arousal of the accompanying emotion, the other denoting
its valence on a positive/negative axis. Ball (2002) makes
use of a Bayesian network to model such a dimensional
approach.1 To this end, arousal and valence are connected
to different types of observable behavior like word types,
speech features, facial expressions or gestures. Prendinger
et al. (2004) describe a similar system that makes use of
physiological sensors to assess the user’s emotional state
in terms of valence and arousal and then uses a Bayesian
network to calculate an appropriate emphatic reaction of
the agent.
Following these ideas, a two-dimensional model of emo-
tions was integrated in Gamble to render the agent’s behav-
ior more interesting and believable on the one hand, and to
prepare the integration of emotion recognition techniques
on the other hand. The agent’s emotional state is influenced
by its game success and by its personality traits. Catching
another player lying, getting away with a lie or being falsely
accused of a lie and thus winning the round constitute a
positive emotional influence. On the other hand, falsely
accusing another player or being caught lying constitutes
a negative emotional influence. The agent’s emotional state
is also influenced by its so-called personality traits. Instead
of using a sophisticated personality model like the five fac-
tor inventory (e.g. McCrae and Costa, 1991), we take the
dimensional model into account directly. Modulator values
for valence and arousal can be specified. These modulators
allow the agent different appraisals of a given situation. A
high modulator value for valence is interpreted as a highly
emotion driven decision process changing fast between
positive and negative evaluation of a situation whereas a
low modulator value results in a more rational decision.
The arousal modulator on the other hand determines
how capricious the agent reacts. A high value of the arou-
sal modulator results in a fast increase of the arousal level
in a given situation whereas a low value slows the increase
down making the agent more phlegmatic. The emotional
state of the agent cannot be directly observed but influences
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through the agent’s facial expressions, gesture use, and
game play behavior. For instance, if a very angry agent is
caught lying, it might very likely start to insult the player
who caught the agent. Although such a behavior is not gen-
erally acceptable, it is very appropriate in this highly emo-
tional situation and well received by the users who
experienced it so far (see Section 5). A happy agent on
the other hand, might accept announcements from a player
that would have been checked, if a purely rational decision
would have been made.
2.3. Agent features
To realize the game, the Greta agent system (Pelachaud
et al., 2002) was employed. It features a full body agent
which is MPEG-4 compliant and thus allows for realistic
facial expressions and gesture animation. The standard
speech synthesis component was exchanged against the
Loquendo Speech Engine which allows for almost natural
speech quality.
2.3.1. Behavior control
The behavior control of the agent takes into account
objective information like the probability of an announce-
ment and subjective information from the agent’s emo-
tional model. To decide for the agent’s context- and
situation-specific verbal and non-verbal behaviors, a
Bayesian network is deployed. Depending on the evidence
available, the network calculates probabilities for possible
actions. A turn in the game can roughly be divided into
two phases: rating and announcing. First, the announce-
ment of the previous player has to be rated. This decision
is based upon (i) the agent’s current emotional state (see
Section 2.2), (ii) the probability of beating the announce-
ment, and (iii) the number of times that the previous player
was caught lying. If the agent is in a positive emotional
state it is more likely that it will accept even a high
announcement. With each announcement, a certain proba-
bility is associated which describes how easily the
announcement can be beaten (see Table 1). A 31 for exam-
ple is the lowest possible announcement and can always be
accepted. A 44 on the other hand leaves only three possible
results the agent has to achieve next and is thus not easily
accepted. Additional information is gained from the
agent’s memory of the player’s previous failures. If a player
was caught repeatedly, the agent will treat his announce-
ment with more care.
If the agent believes the previous player or has falsely
accused him of lying, it has to cast the dice next and
announce a result. The announcement is based upon (i)
the agent’s cast, (ii) the probability to beat the necessary
announcement, (iii) the number of times the agent was
already caught lying, and (iv) the agent’s emotional state.
If the result is higher than the previous player’s announce-
ment, there is nothing much to decide. The agent can
announce the true result. In case the cast is lower, the agentis forced to lie about the result. In this case the probability
which is needed to beat the necessary announcement is
taken into account. If the necessary announcement is
low, e.g. 43, this probability is high, otherwise it is low,
ensuring that the agent is not gambling to high. If the agent
was repeatedly caught lying by the next player this will
result in a more cautious announcement. A positive emo-
tional state of an agent at last might result in increasing
the risk for the announcement.
To sum up, the agent’s behavior depends on a mix of
objective and subjective features ensuring a consistent but
nevertheless not totally predictable behavior.
2.3.2. Gestures
The Greta agent already comes with a standard inven-
tory of gestures that are tied to discourse functions. For
the use in Gamble, the gestural repertoire was extended
by German emblems.
Following the Berlin Lexicon of German Everyday Ges-
tures (BLAG, 2007), 30 different gestures were specified for
the use in Gamble. The rationale for choosing those ges-
tures was threefold. First, they are well documented includ-
ing the use, as well as the form and the meaning of the
gestures. Second, they are clearly identifiable by German
native speakers. 90.5% of the generated gestures are cor-
rectly classified by subjects. Third, at least half of the doc-
umented gestures have a clearly emotion related meaning,
e.g., Waving a hand in front of one’s eyes thereby indicating
that something is stupid, Indicating to one’s wrist which can
be interpreted as ‘‘hurry up”, or Holding the hand as an
extension of the nose, a clear sign of gloating. This makes
them suitable for the use in the game scenario where highly
emotional situations arise that ask for the display of appro-
priate reactions. The agent’s gestures thus reveal its emo-
tional appraisal of the situation allowing the other
participants to form an impression of the agent’s emotional
state.
2.3.3. Facial expressions
Although Greta already offers an extensive library of
facial expressions, this had to be augmented by expres-
sions accompanying lies to prevent the agent from
always showing the perfect poker face. According to
Ekman (2001), there are at least four ways in which
facial expressions may vary if they accompany lies and
deceptions: micro-expressions, masks, timing, and
asymmetry.
 Micro-expressions: A false emotion is displayed, but the
felt emotion is unconsciously expressed for the fraction
of a second. The detection of such micro-expressions is
possible only for a trained observer.
 Masks: The felt emotion (e.g., fear) is masked by a dif-
ferent facial expression, in general by a smile. Because
we are not able to control all of our facial muscles, such
a masking smile is always in some way deficient and
reveals at least in part the original emotion.
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do not last for a very long time. Thus, the longer an
expression lasts the more likely it is that it is accompany-
ing a lie.
 Asymmetry: Voluntarily created facial expressions as
they occur during lying and deceiving tend to be dis-
played in an asymmetrical way, i.e., there is more activ-
ity on one side of the face than on the other.
For our purposes, masks and asymmetry seemed to be
the most promising expressions. We concentrated on mask-
ing smiles for disgust, sadness, anger, and fear. Different
masks are deficient in several aspects. For instance, we con-
sidered masks where the eyebrows are still frowning in
anger, but the mouth displays a normal smile as well as
masks where the frown is not very articulated and there
is only a small smile. Different degrees of masking are com-
bined with different degrees of asymmetry of the facial dis-
plays resulting in 32 possible facial expressions. A pilot
study showed that users were able to notice the differences
between genuine and faked smiles (Rehm and André,
2005a).2.4. Interaction design
Two different interaction devices have been developed
for the Gamble system (Figs. 2 and 3). The first version fea-
tures interaction via a mobile handheld device (PDA) for
each player. Casting the dice, announcing the result, and
rating the announcement of another player is done via a
graphical user interface on the display of the handheld
device. The second version features more natural interac-
tion by speech recognition and a tangible interaction device
which resembles a cup of dice but is equipped with a web-
cam to analyze the actual cast and decide on the game pro-
gress (for a detailed discussion of the two version see Rehm
and André, 2007).3. Verbal and nonverbal interaction behavior
In contrast to the more traditional dyadic interactions
between one user and one agent, our setting allows us toFig. 2. Users interacting with the agent idirectly compare user–user interactions with user–agent
interactions in the same situation at the same time. This
gives us some obvious advantages over the standard evalu-
ation, where behavior is compared to the human-only case
either with findings from the literature or with previous
video recordings of similar interactions between human
interlocutors. Because an embodied conversational agent
is not another human, interaction can only resemble
human interactions but will never be exactly the same.
The general research question we address in our evalua-
tion is ‘‘How do people treat the virtual interaction part-
ner, if another real human interaction partner is
available?” To play the game, it is not really necessary to
socially interact with the virtual character. Our virtual
agents are (at least for the time being) always deficient in
one or the other way, be it in a limited animation reper-
toire, be it in limited conversational capacities, or be it in
limited perceptual abilities. Thus, in a setting where
another human partner is available we can be sure that
the behavior towards the agent will deviate from behavior
that is ‘‘natural” for human–human interactions.
To address this research question, we concentrate on
two types of behavior which will be addressed in the next
two subsections: (i) gaze behavior and (ii) verbal behavior.3.1. Gaze behavior
According to Kendon (1967), we can distinguish
between at least four functions of seeking or avoiding to
look at the partner in dyadic interactions: (i) to provide
visual feedback, (ii) to regulate the flow of conversation,
(iii) to communicate emotions and relationships, (iv) to
improve concentration by restriction of visual input. Ken-
don showed that speakers tend to look away at the begin-
ning of an utterance and turn their attention towards the
conversational partner at the end of an utterance. Goodwin
(1981) found the same effect while analyzing turn begin-
nings and explained that this behavior gives the listener
enough time to concentrate on the speaker and direct his
gaze towards him. If the listener does not follow this pat-
tern, irritations arise and repair mechanisms like restarts
of the turn are initiated by the speaker. Regarding the lis-n Gamble v1.0 (left) and v2.0 (right).
Fig. 3. User interaction via handheld device in Gamble v1.0 (left) and via CamCup, speech recognition and public GUI in Gamble v2.0 (right).
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nearly twice as much while listening (75%) than while
speaking (41%).
Compared to dyadic conversations, we know little about
gaze behavior in multiparty interactions. Vertegaal et al.
(2001) describe a study of the gaze behavior in a four-party
interaction. Subjects looked about 7 times more at the indi-
vidual they listened to (62%) than at others (9%). They
looked about three times more at the individual they spoke
to (40%) than at others (12%). In accordance with Sidner
et al. (2004) or Nakano et al. (2003), they conclude that
gaze is an excellent predictor of conversational attention
in multiparty conversations. Among other things, Verte-
gaal et al. also showed that (i) people look more at the per-
son they speak or listen to than at others, and that (ii)
listeners in a group can still see they are being addressed.
Each person still receives, 1.7 times more gaze than could
be expected had she not been addressed.
The rationale for concentrating on gaze behavior is that
we have a setting where a user is interacting both with
another human and an embodied conversational agent at
the same time. Thus, the user literally has the choice
between a natural interaction partner and a moving image
on the wall. Our hypothesis is that the user’s gaze behavior
will roughly resemble the behavior found for human–
human interaction (following the CASA paradigm) but will
concentrate more on the other human interaction partner,
as it is not necessary for the game flow to pay a lot of atten-
tion to the agent.
3.2. Verbal behavior
Brown and Levinson (1987) show that politeness is one
of the most fundamental verbal behaviors that is found in
every language. They develop a system of politeness strat-
egies that is based on Goffman’s notion of face. To keep
one’s own and the interlocutor’s face in a communication,
it is necessary to mitigate what they call face threats,
attacks on face aspects of the interlocutor. Brown and Lev-
inson distinguish between positive and negative face
aspects. Positive face denotes the individual’s desire to be
evaluated positively whereas negative face is concerned
with the individual’s desire to act free from impositions.According to the two types of face they also introduce posi-
tive and negative politeness strategies.
Using appropriate politeness strategies exemplifies that
the speaker cares for the addressee’s face and thus accepts
her as an interaction partner. But is the lack of such strat-
egies identical with the opposite conclusion? To answer this
question, we have to look closer into the opposing notion
of impoliteness, which is not simply defined by a lack of
politeness. Unfortunately, Brown and Levinson only deal
with politeness strategies, thus defining what is not impolite
behavior. Some have argued that Brown and Levinson’s
direct bald on record strategy which does not care about
mitigating the face threat is a form of impoliteness. But
as Bousfield (2003) shows, even a bald on record strategy
is concerned with keeping the addressee’s face and can only
be applied under special circumstances like an immediate
danger whereas impoliteness is explicitly concerned with
not keeping the face.
To handle this problem Bousfield follows Culpeper’s,
1996) definition of positive and negative impoliteness strat-
egies. Culpeper embraces Brown and Levinson’s distinction
of different face aspects but acknowledges the need for dis-
tinguishing different ways of explicitely not respecting the
addressee’s face needs. The following overview is based
on Bousfield (2003):
 Positive impoliteness
– Ignore or fail to attend to addressee’s interests, wants,
needs, goods, etc.
– Exclude the other from activity.
– Disassociate from the other. Deny common ground, or
association.
– Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic.
– Use inappropriate identity markers.
– Use obscure or secretive language.
– Seek disagreement—sensitive topics or just disagree
outright (act as ‘‘Devil’s advocate”).
– Avoid agreement—avoid agreeing with addressee’s
position (whether speaker actually does or not).
– Make the other feel uncomfortable.
– Use taboo language—swear, be abusive, express strong
views opposed to addressee’s.
– Call addressee names—use derogatory nominations.
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– Frighten—instil a belief that action detrimental to ot-
her will occur.
– Condescend, scorn or ridicule—emphasise own power,
use diminutives to other (or other’s position), be con-
temptuous, belittle, do not take addressee seriously.
– Invade the other’s space—literally (positioning closer
than relationship permits) or metaphorically (ask for
intimate information given the relationship).
– Explicitly associate addressee with negative aspect—
personalise, use pronouns, ‘‘I” and ‘‘you”.
– Put addressee’s indebtedness on record.
– Hinder—physically (block passage), conversationally
(deny turn, interrupt).
Similar to the politeness strategies, the use of impo-
liteness strategies emphasizes that the speaker interprets
the addressee as someone (something) that has face
aspects that can be threatened. Otherwise, it would not
be worth the while going to the length of applying such
communicative strategies. Thus, the use of such strate-
gies with the virtual game partner in Gamble can be
interpreted as accepting this agent as a full-blown com-
municative partner. Does refraining from the use of such
strategies—either polite or impolite—then symbolizes
that the agent is not seen as worth while to interact with
in a communicative appropriate way? This is not neces-
sarily true.
If the users employ appropriate strategies, this would
exemplify Reeves and Nass’s (1996) proposed CASA par-
adigm and strengthen the view that agents are really seen
as something similar to a human communication partner.
But as we have argued above, our agents are always defi-
cient in some ways but nevertheless they have features
which make it easy to anthropomorphize the agent but
still keep it in a different category from human interlocu-
tors. Bergmann (1988) analyses interaction with and
about pets and gives some interesting findings on how
they are similar yet at the same time different from inter-
actions with human interlocutors. His analysis gives us a
clue as to how agents might be interpreted by the users.
Bergmann shows that utterances directed towards a pet
are soon changed into utterances about the pet, which
seems to be the dominant form of interaction with/about
pets. Bergmann distinguishes four different ways of talk-
ing about pets:
(1) Anecdotes narrate real events in which the pet takes a
major role.
(2) Interpretation of behavior: The pets behavior is not
always directly understandable and has to be inter-
preted in a ‘‘human” way.
(3) Evaluation: The pet or the pet’s behavior is evalu-
ated, again in relation to a ‘‘human” standard.
(4) Attribution of a motive: The rationale behind the
pet’s actions has to be explained, thus a motive is
assigned to the pet’s behavior.Thus, his analysis might give us a clue on what
happens if users start interacting with technical arti-
facts like virtual interface agents. But Bergmann gives
us an additional insight. Communication with pets
turns often in communication about pets if another
human interaction partner is available. Thus, the Gam-
ble setting is ideal to evaluate if a similar effect can be
seen.
Because the user has the choice between a real human
interaction partner and the virtual game partner, our
hypothesis is again that the user will concentrate on the sec-
ond human. It is not necessary for the game flow to address
the agent directly or start a verbal interaction with the
agent.4. Evaluating gaze behavior
Two evaluation studies with 20 participants were con-
ducted with the two versions of the Gamble system. 10
pairs played at least two games, which each lasted for at
least 10 minutes. Positions were changed between games
to ensure that each participant played at least once before
and after the agent. Interactions were recorded on video.
The video recordings were used to analyze gaze behavior
as well as verbal interactions. Twelve students from the
computer science and from communication science partic-
ipated in the first evaluation with Gamble v1.0, eight stu-
dents from computer science in the second evaluation
with Gamble v2.0.
As we have seen above (Section 3.1) gaze behaviors dif-
fer whether one is in the role of speaker or listener. Thus,
two questions guided the evaluation of gaze behavior in
the Gamble studies:
 Do people apply different attentive behavior patterns in
multi-party scenarios when talking to an agent as
opposed to talking to a human?
 Do people apply different attentive behavior patterns in
multi-party scenarios when listening to an agent as
opposed to listening to a human?
The following hypotheses result from these questions:
(1) Based on Argyle and Cook (1976) and Vertegaal et al.
(2001), we assume that humans spend more time on
looking at the agent when listening to it than when
talking to it.
(2) Following Kendon (1967), we expect similar behav-
iors at sentence boundaries as in human-human
communication.
(3) Since the communicative skills of the agent are
strongly limited, we expect that the user will pay more
attention to the other human conversational partner.
For instance, the user might not establish frequent
gaze contact with the agent since he does not expect
it to notice it anyway.
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Starting with some basic statistics for Gamble v1.0, Fig. 4
(left) shows the number of gazes towards each of the given
directions. The players looked roughly as often towards
the virtual agent (27%) as towards the other human player
(30%). Just considering the number of gazes, the agent seems
to be as attractive as the other player. The fact that people
look slightly more often at the PDA (38%) could be attrib-
uted to its use as the interface for casting the dice and indicat-
ing belief or disbelief. Analyzing the time users spent gazing
in the given directions gives a different picture (see Fig. 5
(left)). The PDA is looked at for more than half of the time
(55%) and thus draws too much attention away from the
interaction partners. This effect resulted in the development
of the CamCup and the integration of the speech recognition
engine as unobtrusive interaction devices. For the evaluation
of Gamble v2.0, the number and length of gazes towards the
interaction devices (CamCup and Microphone) and the newFig. 4. Number of gazes towards o
Fig. 5. Length of gazes towards otGUI (Board) vs. towards the agent show the opposite direc-
tion to the results we obtained for Gamble v1.0 (see Fig. 4
(right) and Fig. 5 (right)). The agent now draws most of
the human players’ attention both regarding the number of
gazes (38%) and the length of gazes (52% of the time).
The total number of gazes and the length of gazes during
the game provide a rough impression of the users’ attention
towards human and virtual interlocutors. A more detailed
analysis of the users’ gaze behavior during announcements
and belief-statements of the other players (human as well as
agent) gave some additional insights. The results of the first
study (Rehm and André, 2005b) confirmed a number of
findings about attentive behaviors in human–human con-
versation. For instance, our subjects spent more time look-
ing at an individual when listening to it than when talking
to it—no matter whether the individual was a human or a
virtual agent. Furthermore, the type of the addressee (agent
or human) did not have any significant impact on the
duration of the speaker’s gaze behaviors towards thether human and towards agent.
her human and towards agent.
Table 2
Addressee’s gaze behavior towards agent or other player
Gaze behavior Agent Human Result
Gamble v1.0 31.75 20.17 F(1,23) = 23.87*
Gamble v2.0 20 14.25 F(1,7) = 1.92
* p < 0.05.
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paying any attention to the agent’s non-verbal communica-
tive behaviors, the users attended to it.
The type of the speaker on the other hand had a signif-
icant effect on the addressee at least for the first version of
the system (Table 2). This means that the agent is signifi-
cantly longer looked at when it is speaking compared with
the other human player when he is speaking.
As mentioned above, some interesting effects can be
found at utterance boundaries. Therefore, we analysed
the gaze behavior of speaker and addressee at the begin-
ning and end of utterances, again for the two conditions
agent and human. The speaker looks less to the addressee
at the beginning and more at the end of an utterances inde-
pendent on the condition agent or human and thus adheres
to the effects found in the literature.4.2. Discussion
The results show that users adhere in certain aspects to
gaze behavior that is described in the literature when they
are interacting with the agent. The question arises if the other
aspects of users’ gaze behavior can be interpreted as rude or
impolite. This is not necessarily the case. But we can identify
two kinds of gaze behavior that fall into this category.
(1) Ignoring denotes behavior where the interlocutor is
not looked at although this would be the acceptable
behavior. An example is a speaker that never looks
at his addressee during his turn.
(2) Staring denotes behavior where the interlocutor is
looked at for a longer time span. It is culturally depen-
dent if this behavior is interpreted as impolite or not
(Ting-Toomey, 1999). But at least for the German cul-
ture continued staring is interpreted as impolite.
Although our hypothesis was that the users will tend to
ignore the agent because they have another human game
partner to interact with, the opposite behavior was observed
during the evaluation studies. Two different types of staring
were visible for the two different versions of the system.
We have seen above, that users adhere to gaze behavior
that is described in the literature when they are addressing
the agent. This is not always true when they are addressed
by the agent (see Table 2). The addressee is following a
pattern of gaze behavior that is typical of human-human
conversation, in looking towards the speaker at the begin-
ning and away at the end of his utterance. But the agent is
attracting more attention than the other human user. ForGamble v1.0 this difference is even significant. This means,
the agent is stared at by the user while being addressed by
it. During the other time of the game, the PDA draws too
much attention to observe the agent continuously. In the
evaluation of Gamble v2.0 staring occurs at another time
during the game. The attention that was directed towards
the PDA in version 1.0 is now directed towards the agent
which is observed half of the time of the game (Fig. 5
(right): 52%).
We interpret this effect by the users’ need to make sense
of the new technical artifact they have encountered. Every
participant had already seen different types of agents in lec-
tures they attended. Moreover, they were recruited with a
video that showed the Gamble system in action. And they
had the possibility to get acquainted with the system before
the recording started. Nevertheless, the effect was visible
and it did not fade between the different sessions that each
pair played. Despite all this, it was the first time that par-
ticipants actually interacted with an embodied conversa-
tional agent. Thus, the close observance of the agent
could be attributable to some kind of novelty effect. The
two different kinds of staring can be accounted for by the
difference in interaction devices. In Gamble v1.0, the
PDA drew the attention of the users most of the time.
Thus, their only chance to closely observe the agent’s
behavior was while it was addressing them. With the Cam-
Cup and the speech recognition engine in Gamble v2.0, the
user’s attention was free to closely observe the agent during
the game and not only while it was addressing the user.
If this staring behavior is attributable to a novelty effect
has to be verified by a long-term study where participants
repetitively play the game. If the effect vanishes, there is
no need to deal with this type of seemingly rude behavior.
5. Evaluating verbal behavior
The video data collected in the above described evalua-
tion was also used for analyzing the verbal behavior of the
users. To this end, the verbal utterances of the users and
the agent were transcribed. In contrast to the evaluation
of user’s gaze behavior, which could be analysed in a quan-
titative way, the analysis of the transcriptions is mostly
done in a qualitative exemplary fashion due to the fact that
the users’ behavior is not unambiguous. The analysis con-
centrates on the use of politeness or to be more precise
impoliteness strategies on the one hand and on utterances
denoting communicative behavior that can be interpreted
in line with Bergmann’s findings.
5.1. Accepting the agent as a conversational partner
According to Brown and Levinson (1987) the use of the
personal pronoun ‘‘You” is a positive politeness strategy
and signals that the speaker is caring for the face needs
of the addressee. Thus, directly addressing the agent in
the interaction or directly reacting to the agent’s utterances
by making use of the second person singular pronoun
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versational partner. The following transcripts give an
impression of such interactions.
(1) Addressing the agent
 U: Tja Greta, Fuenferpasch.
(Well Greta, 55.)
A: Wird schon stimmen.
(Will be alright.)
 U: Ich glaub’s dir nicht.
(I don’t believe you.)
A: Du hast verloren.
(You have lost.)(2) Reacting to the agent
 A: Na ja, ich glaub’ dir mal.
(Well, I think I believe you.)
U: Ah so, jetzt glaubst du alles oder?
(Ah, now you believe everything, don’t
you?)
 A: Ich habe 61.
(I have 61.)
U: Ich glaub’s dir.
(I believe you.)2 Translations by author. Comment: a bit difficult to translate the insults
into English.Thirty-eight percent of utterances that used an address
form fall into this category where the agent is directly
addressed by the user. This effect was visible in both ver-
sions of the system. This means, the agent is sometimes
addressed in a very natural way although it is not necessary
for the interaction and although in Gamble v1.0 there was
not even a speech recognition integrated which could have
led to the impression that the agent is able to understand
the players’ utterances.
The setting of the game makes it difficult to see more
politeness strategies at work due to the fact that one has
to constantly rate the announcement of others which is
either done directly Ich glaub’ dir (I believe you) or
delivered with mitigating terms like vielleicht (per-
haps) or na ja (well) like in Na ja dann glaub ich
dir mal (Well then I think I believe you). On the other
hand, impoliteness strategies play an important role espe-
cially when player’s react to having lost a round. In this
case, two of the positive impoliteness strategies of Culpeper
(1996) can be found frequently in our corpus, namely
‘‘using taboo language” and ‘‘calling the other names”
which can both be classified as insults.
Insults are a special case of verbal interactions in our
system. Generally, insults are rarely acceptable in human-
human everyday interaction. Such an exception is for
instance described by Labov (1972)). He examined
‘‘sounding”, insult rituals of adolescents in suburban cul-
tures. These rituals have to follow certain rules to be
acceptable. In case of Gamble, the game concept is origi-
nally a drinking game in Germany, and the fun of the game
arises of the interactions between the participants, i.e. how
they try to deceive the others, how they react to beingcaught. When the game gets heated, swearing or insulting
are not necessarily seen as an offence but most of the time
lead to amused comments of the other players. Thus,
although insults can generally be interpreted as impolite
behavior, they do not constitute an abuse of the interface
agent per se in our scenario. One could even venture out
and claim that it is quite contrary a sign of acceptance of
the agent, if the user goes to the length of insulting the
agent. Obviously, two situations are prototypical for start-
ing to insult the agent. Either the agent caught a player
lying about his result or a player did not believe the agent’s
announcement but was mistaken in this disbelief. In both
cases the player loses the round and the agent generally
makes a taunting comment on this, often accompanied
by an appropriate gesture e.g. a gloating gesture. The fol-
lowing is a collection of insults by the users for the two
situations.2
(1) Player was caught lying
 U: Bloede Kuh.
(Stupid cow.)
 U: Verfluchte Scheisse.
(Damned shit.)
 U: Die kann mich mal.
(Sod you.)(2) Player lost because he didn’t believe the agent
 U: Ey du pfff bescheisst doch.
(Ey, you pfff screw me.)
 U: Arschloch.
(Asshole.)
 U: Oh nein, Greta, Scheisse.
(Oh no, Greta shit.)Insulting the other game partners is not a privilege of the
human players. The agent’s emotional model allows us to
simulate an agent that can be really ‘‘pissed off” e.g. by
having lost continuously. This might then result in insult-
ing the other players. The hardest insult in this case is Du
bloedes Arschgesicht (You stupid butthead). This
insult is rarely used by the agent. In the two evaluation
studies it happened only three times. One of the pairs
was quite irritated and decided to ignore this behavior.
The other two pairs found this reaction of the agent quite
amusing and made comments on the sophisticated interac-
tion capabilities of the agent. Thus, simulating the agent’s
foul mood in a plausible way, seems to make the agent
more believable and acceptable as a game partner.
Generally, insults are rarely acceptable in face to face
communication. But in the setting we established with this
game of dice, swearing and insulting the others (in a playful
fashion) is an acceptable feature of the interaction. Thus,
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cannot accept that agents insult the user or vice versa,
because it is rude, impolite and will surely annoy the user,
it is a useful feature here to make the system more believ-
able and acceptable as a game mate. Thus, users that start
insulting the agent are really accepting it as a full-fledged
game partner that is even able to surprise them (otherwise
there would not be a need to get angry about one’s own
stupidity or the agent’s good strategy (and/or luck).
Apart from the above mentioned strategies, the negative
impoliteness strategy of ‘‘ridiculing the addressee” can be
found in the users’ interactions with the agent. Most of
the agent’s phrases were modeled after observations of real
players of the game and are very suitable for the game.
Now the effect occurs, that some of the more catchy
phrases of the agent like Immer dieses Misstrauen
(Always this mistrust), Was mach’ ich jetzt nur?
(What shall I do now?) or Da muss ich erstmal
ueberlegen (I have to think about it) were imitated by
the human players in corresponding situations. This imita-
tion is not only an adoption of catchy phrases but it is
meant as a means of mocking the agent because the users
also imitated how the agent spoke the phrases.
The Gamble setting allows us to compare the user’s ver-
bal behavior towards the agent with the verbal behavior
towards the other player. In case of the address forms,
we observed that in roughly half of the cases the second
person singular pronoun is used. In the rest of the utter-
ances no address form at all is used like Glaub’ ich (I
believe it) or Okay to signal believe of an announcement.
The indirect address form which was used with the agent
in 62% of the utterances that featured an address form
(see next two sections) was never employed when the userstalked with each other. The number of insults as defined
above by the two positive impoliteness strategies was
roughly the same for the human–human and the human–
agent case and thus indicates that it is indeed a sign of
accepting the agent as a communication partner. The neg-
ative politeness strategy of ridiculing the other on the other
hand was never used between human players. This indeed
seems to be a case of abusive behavior towards the agent
that is mocked about due to its limited vocabulary and
its slightly odd way of pronunciation.5.2. Interpreting the agent’s behavior
We have seen above that in 38% of the utterances that
featured an address form the second person singular pro-
noun ‘‘You” was used. The rest, i.e. 62% of the utterances
that used an address form employed the third person singu-
lar pronoun ‘‘sie” (she) instead, which signifies that the user
was talking about the agent and not with the agent. Talk-
ing about someone who is actually present in the situation
is generally not acceptable. According to Bergmann (1988),
even very small children react vehemently if parents violate
this ‘‘rule” and try to tell a story about the child’s behavior
to relatives or friends.
This behavior seems only acceptable if the object under
discussion is a pet, a baby, or not present. Otherwise it is
interpreted as very rude.
Apart from anecdotes, all of the categories described by
Bergmann (see Section 3.2) can be found in the Gamble
interactions which is exemplified by the following interac-
tion samples.(1) Interpretation of behavior
 A: So geht das aber nicht. Du hast verloren.
(What do you think you’re doing. You have lost.)
U: Ich hatte 52. Was will die denn jetzt?
(I had a 52. What does she want now?)
 A: Ich habe einen Dreier-, aeh Viererpasch.
(I have 33, eeh 44.)U: Die luegt nur wenn’s sein muss.
(She is only lying if it is necessary.)
 A: Na, dann werd’ ich mal mein Glueck versuchen.
(Well, then I will try my luck now.)
U: Jetzt kommt sie wieder mit Dreierpasch oder so.
(Now she will have a 33 again or something like it.)(2) Evaluation
 U1: Die ist echt witzig, oder?
(She is really funny, isn’t she?
U2: Gretchen bekommt die 5 Euro bestimmt.
(Greta is surely getting the 5 Euro.)
 A: Du hast verloren.
(You have lost.)U: Ach, die ist doch bloed.
(Aah, she is just stupid.)
Table
Relativ
Interpr
28%
Indirec
22%
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(I don’t believe you.)
U1: Ja ich weiss.
(Yes I know.)
U2: Ooh, die zwinkert so schoen.
(Ooh, she blinks to nicely.)(3) Attibution of a motive
 A: Aehh, dann sag’ ich mal 64.
(Eeh, I think I say 64.)
U: Sie will dich verunsichern.
(She is trying to confuse you.)
 A: 23, ich meine 32.
(23, I mean 32.)
U: Du verarscht mich, du machst mich nach.
(You are fooling me, you are imitating me.)
 A: Jetzt musst du einen Schnaps trinken.
(Now you have to drink a shot.)
U: Das Ding, ich wusste nicht, dass das so gemein sein kann.
(The thing, I didn’t know that it can be so mean.)Table 3 gives an overview on the relative frequencies of
the different categories we have identified here. Utterances
that are made to evaluate and explain the agent’s behavior
as defined by Bergmann are the biggest group with 56%
(interpretation, evaluation and attribution). This means,
users are frequently talking about the agent and trying to
make sense of this new technical artifact. This behavior is
exclusively seen for the human–agent interactions.5.3. Ignoring the agent
Additionally to the above categories, we found another
recurring form of verbal interaction with the agent, the
indirect address. In the sample interactions above, we have
already seen the use of the third person singular pronoun
‘‘sie” (she). But the utterances were not addressed to the
agent. The users tried to interpret the behavior of the agent
or evaluated the agent. In the case of what we call an indi-
rect address, the utterance is directly game relevant and
directed towards the agent, i.e. either an announcement
or a belief statement, but nevertheless the agent is not
directly addressed as we have seen in Section 5.1. An exam-
ple of such a statement is Ich glaub’ ihr nicht (I
don’t believe her). In this example, the user is reacting to
the agent’s announcement of a result. He could easily have
used the direct address form Ich glaub’ dir nicht (I3
e frequency of occurence of verbal categories
etation Evaluation Attribution
17% 11%
t Address Imitation Insults
5% 17%don’t believe you) or he could have left out the pronoun
completely like in Glaub’ ich nicht (I do not believe
(it)) which would have rendered the utterance totally
acceptable. Instead, users frequently opt for the use of this
third person singular pronoun and thus signify that the
agent is somehow different from the other human player.
Of course this kind of address is never used with the other
human player.6. Discussion
The evaluation studies showed that the agent is both
accepted as a game (and conversational) partner by the
human players and that the agent is nevertheless treated
in a special way and sometimes in a way that would be
interpreted as rude if it was directed towards a human
interlocutor.
Analyzing the users’ gaze and verbal behavior, we can
distinguish three different ways of interacting with the
agent:
(1) Acceptance represents that the users treat the agent
as a game mate similar to the other human interlocu-
tor, adhering to gaze behavior found in human–
human interactions, directly addressing it, or reacting
to its verbal and non-verbal behavior either in a
polite or impolite way.
(2) Interpretations describe situations where the users try
to make sense of the agent’s behavior either by closely
observing the agent or by discussing the behavior
with the other player.
(3) Ignoring denotes behavior where the users treat the
agent as if it is not part of the setting, addressing it
in the third person.
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tions with the agent, i.e. there is no complete acceptance of
the agent neither a complete disregard of the agent. The
question now arises, how we should deal with this kind of
behavior mix from the user. Should we react to his impolite
or rude behavior regarding the agent? Or should we accept it
as the ‘‘natural” way of interacting with the agent? Our
answer to this is: both. The behavior we encountered in the
evaluation studies has different reasons and serves different
purposes. First of all, we have to accept that embodied con-
versational agents are new technical artifacts that have not
been widely introduced to the public yet. Thus, users that
are confronted with such agents have first to develop an idea
on what the agent is capable of and how it reacts in certain
situations. And although embodied agents are designed to
simulate natural communication behaviors, agents will
never be treated in exactly the same way as a human interloc-
utor due to the simple fact that they are no humans.
Having said that, the behaviors encountered in the eval-
uation studies should each be handled in a different way.
The impolite behavior like insulting and imitating the agent
does not only emphasize that the agent is regarded as a
conversational partner whom’s face needs can be violated
but is in case of the Gamble system even acceptable behav-
ior that is a natural part of the gaming interaction. To
make the agent even more believable it should react to an
insult with a suitable answer thus acknowledging the play-
ful character of this interaction. If users discuss the agent’s
features by talking about the agent, this symbolizes the
users’ need to rationalize about the artifact they are just
encountering. In this case, the agent could offer some help
in interpreting its behavior instead of just being offended. If
on the other hand, utterances that should be addressed to
the agent are in fact phrased in a way that implies talking
about the agent it might be a reasonable reaction of the
agent to make an appropriate comment to this rude behav-
ior because it interrupts the flow of the interaction. Thus,
to make the agent even more acceptable as some kind of
interaction partner, it would be good to react to such clues.
The same is true for continuous staring of the user. Get-
ting some attention of the user might be acceptable due to
the fact that the user is trying to get acquainted with the
agent. But staring at the agent for half of the whole inter-
action time should not be accepted. For the interaction in
Gamble it is not so crucial that the other human player
does not get as much attention as the agent. But by staring
at the agent, the user avoids eye contact with the other
human interlocutor. This could get critical in applications
that rely on the collaboration of the users.7. Conclusion
In creating embodied conversational agents as interfaces
we allow users to interact with complex systems relying on
their everyday communicative abilities. To further this inter-
action, we try to make our agents ever more lifelike and theirverbal and non-verbal behavior as ‘‘natural” or to be more
precise as human-like as possible. Nevertheless, the above
presented results show that the users are of course well aware
of the ‘‘otherness” of our artifacts and thus come up with
new behavior routines for such artifacts. This is not a bad
thing but quite to the contrary a necessary step in accepting
embodied conversational agents as kind of interaction part-
ners that offer an additional value for the interaction. But as
developers of agent systems, we have to take this into
account for our system models. This means that we should
not only opt for the best comparison with human–human
interactions but that we take the specifics of human–agent
interactions and the differences to human–human interac-
tions into account to make agents more acceptable, e.g. by
letting the agent explain its own behavior if the user starts
to rationalize about the agent.
Users anthropomorphize agents and treat them as com-
munication partners but only to a certain degree. This is a
weak interpretation of Reeves and Nass’s (1996) CASA
paradigm (Computers Are Social Actors). Bergmann
(1988) makes a similar comment in his work on pets. In
his opinion, it is unavoidable to anthropomorphize pets.
But he also states that humans often avoid treating them
in the same way that they treat other humans. Our argu-
ment follows these lines. Agents are of course perceived
as anthropomorphic entities, they are designed that way.
But they are always in some way deficient be it in not being
aware of the context, be it in a restricted vocabulary or in a
restricted set of animations, be it in the quality of the
speech synthesis. Thus, users will also always know that
there is a difference between agents and human interlocu-
tors and they will thus also always treat agents differently
to a certain degree.
We have seen in our evaluation of the users’ gaze behav-
ior as well as the users’ verbal behavior that we can distin-
guish between three ways of interacting with the agent
which are not clearly distinguishable between different users
but are mingled together in every interaction. Acceptance
denotes that users sometimes accept the agent as a commu-
nication partner that is worth talking to (although the agent
can only understand some digits and yes/no-variants).
Insults, although rude and impolite in general, are another
sign of acceptance and attribution of competence towards
the agent in this scenario. But mingled with these forms of
interaction where the agent is treated as a full-fledged inter-
locutor, there are also a lot of situations where the agent is
treated as an artifact. Is this a problem? We think not,
because the users’ utterances show that most of the time
they talk about the agent, they are trying to figure out what
the agent is capable of, to make sense of this somewhat
astonishing technical artifact. This gives us information
on what kind of features the users attribute to the agent.
Future work on the Gamble system will need to aug-
ment the agent’s abilities to perceive situational factors like
they were apparent in the evaluation studies. A first option
is extending the agent’s emotional model by a real-time
emotion recognition component that analyses the speech
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user setting (Hegel et al., 2006). An eye tracker could be
integrated as another input device which would allow the
agent to register the user’s gaze behavior and react to con-
tinuous staring. Such an integration would mean to move
away from a multiple user scenario. But a multiplayer set-
ting is imaginable where one user plays with two agents.
Last but not least, a long-term study is planned that will
shed light on two questions: (i) To what degree is the users’
behavior attributable to some kind of novelty effect? (ii)
What kind of stable user–agent interaction patterns emerge
after longer interaction periods and how do they differ
from human-human patterns of behavior?
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